Book Review: The Marketing of Rebellion- Insurgents, Media and International Activism

The Marketing of Rebellion

Insurgents, Media and International Activism

Author Clifford Bob (2005)

 Bob, C. (2005). The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism. Cambridge
University Press.

Book Review by Dr. Shahbaz Israr Khan 

 The book review has been published in Peace and Conflict Review Volume 6-Issue 1 ISSN: 1659-3995

Who shall earn the support, the savviest or the neediest? Most probably the savviest! I am not talking about the corporate sector support, where the Darwinian norms and rules reign supreme, but the support of the global civil society. Is it astonishing? As most of us consider the opposite in case of civil society; the support goes to the neediest not the savviest. Assume the causes which are the neediest but cannot draft proposals or communicate in international languages, cannot operate the websites, their profile does not match the profile of the donor and so on. Will they be supported by the civil society?  Answer is perhaps no. Why? 

Effective causes and movements need resources, media projection, national and transnational support to challenge the opposition. In contrast, the harsh reality is that the global civil societies have limited resources and choose to support the causes that best suits to their own goals, objectives and agendas and have potential to win the cause, in this process a strict cost to benefit analysis of movements is done and only a handful movements get the support. In these ‘Darwinian Markets’ movements have to best prepare themselves according to the international demands and criteria and in doing so they need to market themselves aggressively, effectively and efficiently in order to gain major transnational backing by civil society and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Clifford Bob’s book, “The Marketing of Rebellion-Insurgents, Media and International Activism” accounts several factors and strategies required by movements and insurgencies for gaining media attention and international support in contemporary world politics. Bob systematically compares two recent movements: Nigeria’s Ogoni ethnic group and Mexico’s Zapatistas rebels that won the major support and NGOs backing. Both of these movements became the global causes while other similar movements remained isolated and obscure. Through in-depth analysis author highlights two broad marketing strategies that made these movements superior and more receptive in the international community including: i) raising NGO awareness by movements through targeted lobbying and diffuse consciousness-raising (primary using the media) and ii) framing of movements to match NGO’s goals, culture, tactics, ethics and organizational needs.

In the first case of Nigeria’s Ogoni ethnic group, Movement for the Survival of the Ogani People (MOSOP) had a influential leader who had forceful command over English, broad understanding of the NGO and media scene and experience in advertising, television and journalism- Saro-Wiwa. In the beginning the movement failed to get the transnational support because of failure to match Key NGO attributes, interests and requirements and inability to grab the media attention. Learning from mistakes, the movement framed its grievances according to the NGO requirement and demands thus matching their goal, objectives and tactics. Awareness of NGOs about the campaign was raised through lobbying. MOSOP adopted the environmental frame by playing the ‘Shell Card’- an environmental campaign against Shell Company. Thus giving issue a global dimension of environment and indigenous rights attracted the support of NGOs and the media.  The oppression of the government against the minorities attracted human right organizations to back the movement. One of the main reasons to support MOSOP by NGOs was its non-violence strategy against the opponents as compared to other movements, like Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), of the area which adopted violence strategies and were unable to get major transnational support. 

In the second case of Mexico Zapatista rebellion, the movement Mexico’s Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) made itself known to the world through diffuse consciousness-raising (primary using the media)  in 1994 when 2500 lightly armed Zapatista soldiers captured the city, San Cristobal de las Casas. Zapatistas proclaimed themselves the product of 500 years struggle by Mexico’s poor and dispossessed. For international awareness and support Zapatistas used media as one of the main tools by making themselves easily available to media, developing printed and electronic materials and its distribution to wider audience, launching of website, developing close contacts with the journalists and interviews granted to major periodicals such as the New York Times. Significantly, Marcos played a figurehead role in the promotion of the movement by his writings, interesting and convincing style of communication made him ‘international icon of revolt’. On the other hand EZLN also changed its strategies according to international market demands for instance they shunned military attacks and adopted armed non violence and transformed their socialist demands to indigenous rights. Moreover, they also opposed the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and Neoliberal-ism in order to boost the movement. In contrast, the EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army) in Mexico was unable to score massive support both inside and outside the country. One of the main reasons of EPR failure was its inflexible policies, inability to attract the media and their retention to violent strategies.

To this end, Bob makes five arguments: i) international support by global civil society or Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is neither easy nor automatic instead competitive and uncertain; ii) development and retention of support are best conceived not as philanthropic gestures but as exchanges based on relative powers of each party to the transaction; iii) competition for NGO intervention in a context of economic, political and organizational inequality that systematically advantages some challengers over others; iv) despite these structural biases, the choices of insurgents- how they market themselves- matter; and v) because of this market dynamic, the effect of assistance are more ambiguous than is often acknowledged.

Although framing a movement according to international standards has its benefits but it may have grave consequences for movement’s original motives, goals and objectives. So, one must be very cautious that while framing the issue according to international resonant lines, one’s own campaign must not be hijacked or totally misunderstood. As Bob mentions that Ogani had won world wide exposure, some of their friends in the indigenous rights community were shaking their heads at how movement’s original demands for political autonomy had gone completely misunderstood abroad compared with environmental and human rights issues.  In addition, the book also paints bleak picture of contemporary global civil society/ NGOs that is mostly unseen, the book also comes up with recommendation that the global civil society should reshape their goals, tactics and expand their mission according to the needs of the larger populations. So that support may reach the neediest as compared to the savviest.

The book is written in simple yet interesting and eloquent style. The comparisons between the different movements and groups within two very different societies (Mexico and Nigeria) against very different opponents and subsequent analysis of their successes and failures in a global context have made this book worth reading.